The Constitutional Reform: the Introduction of a Constitutional Limit on the Structural Public Deficit
Last September 2nd the Spanish Parliament amended the Spanish Constitution. The reform was addressed to establish a Constitutional limit on the structural public deficit. The development of its concrete terms would be the matter of an organic law (a reinforced-majority piece of legislation reserved for the development of certain constitutional matters).

Although the importance of the reform certainly refers to its content, as a matter of facts its purpose was nowhere near as controversial as the means by which the reform was implemented.

First of all and in order to understand the debate, one has to take into account that constitutional reforms have been treated by most political parties as a complete taboo. Apart from its institutional role, the Constitution has been understood as a symbol of the large but also fragile political consensus that featured the Spanish transition to the democracy and brought about a political and societal funding pact. Thus, the idea of its reform has been largely perceived (but also made be perceived) as a threat to the fragile equilibrium and complex consensus forged during the Transition; as a consequence, the issue has been explicitly kept out of the political agenda. Only one reform has been passed since its establishment: the inclusion of political rights for EU citizens following the requirements derived from the Treaty of Maastricht, and it was passed by unanimity.

Thus, in these circumstances, in mid August, the Spanish Government announced its intention to introduce a constitutional limit of public deficit, following the German experience. In a record time, the reform was agreed exclusively between the Socialist Party and the PP at a central level, to the complete exclusion of all other parliamentary parties, of the Autonomous Communities and of the citizens themselves (arguments that such a constitutional reform should be put to a referendum were rejected).

The reform proposal was passed by the Congreso (lower chamber) with the votes of the Socialists, PP and Navarra's regionalist party members (316 votes in favour). Some parliamentary groups refused to take part of the voting (the Catalan and Basque moderate nationalists) and some others, as a sign of protest, left the parliament at the moment of the voting (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Izquierda Unida, Bloque Nacionalista Galego and Nafarroa Bai. Votes against came form the Canarian nationalists, the Spanish nationalists (Unión, Progreso y Democracia) and 2 members of he Socialist party. Outside the parliamentary arenas and showing its contempt for both the content and, specially, the means the reform was implemented, the Government of Catalonia announced that the reform should to be understood as the breaking off the constitutional pact.

Constitutional Reform (in Spanish)

More information
BBC News: "Spain moves closer to constitutional budget deficit cap", August 30th.
CNA Catalan News Agency: "Spain's two main parties agree on a constitutional amendment without the explicit support from other parties", August 28th.
See more on the CNA Catalan News Agency's section on the Constitutional Amendment.

The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Self-government
At the beginning of the economic crisis, most analyses showed that the crisis and its policy effects were not having any direct influence on the debate on the nature of self-government itself. Recent events have changed this situation dramatically: the political measures that Central Government has adopted to address the crisis have implied increasing centralization which has thus had a direct and negative effect on self-government, and which has clearly linked the political and social debate about the crisis to the debate on self-government by the autonomous communities.

Although the clearest example of these measures is the recent reform of the Constitution that has been mentioned above, another key example was the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court in July 2011 that Central Government has the power to establish limits on the spending of the Autonomous Communities through the establishment of compulsory objectives of budgetary stability. This ruling referred to an appeal against the Spanish law on budgetary stability (2001) which had been made by the Parliament of Catalonia.

The economic crisis has reignited debate on self-government in Spain because it has made it clearer than ever that self-government is highly constricted by the Autonomous Communities' economic dependence on Central Government resources. Such dependence is perceived by some as limitations which are necessary in order to address the economic crisis, and by others as the main obstacle in allowing solutions to be found.

In purely practical terms, the very high level of debt at all levels of public administration has resulted in debates on self-government being focussed on economic efficiency and the simplification of public administration.

Some argue that one cause, or even the main cause, of these debt problems is the level of spending of the Autonomous Communities. Thus, the re-centralization of powers to Central Government and the tightening of controls on the spending of the Autonomous Communities are seen as key elements in dealing with the economic crisis. As a consequence, the Autonomous Communities, which have to meet the costs of delivering basic welfare services (their powers include healthcare, primary and secondary education, and social services), have seen Central Government postpone and cut its intergovernmental transfers. It has even claimed back the difference between the sums it advanced in respect of the 2010 income tax yields and the sums finally collected. In this sense, it is hardly surprising that the Presidents of some Autonomous Communities have said that they would like powers on education and health to be re-centralized to Central Government.

From other perspectives, however, dependence on revenue from Central Government is seen as the main handicap for both the development of self-government and for economic recovery. The strangling effects that economic dependence has on the political margin of manoeuvre of the Autonomous Communities, together with the dramatic influence that Spanish internal politics has on Central Government's policy decisions affecting the territory (location infrastructures, research policy), leave territorial economic and social needs in a secondary position.

In this sense, the Catalan Parliament has established a Committee to develop a proposal for a new system of financing for Catalonia, which is to be inspired by the independent tax systems already in place in Navarre and the Basque Country (in these two Autonomous Communities taxes are raised directly and then some of this money is transferred to Central Government).

Such considerations are also influencing the growing distance between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. Recent polls carried out in Catalonia have for the first time asked questions about a hypothetical referendum for the independence of Catalonia. 42.9% of respondents said they would vote in favour (compared with 20.2% who would vote against and 23.3% who would abstain), and among all the reasons given by those who say they would vote in favour, economic and fiscal arguments predominate: 36.4% of those who say they would vote in favour of independence cite economic reasons (in order to increase economic and fiscal autonomy); the second most popular reason (that the Spanish do not understand the Catalans) was given by 13.6%.

Link to the Spanish Constitutional Court's decision (in Spanish)

Documents and debates
In order to promote understanding and debate on the Catalan and Spanish political context, we have selected some articles in English which, from different angles, deal with the current debates on the economic crisis and self-government in Spain.

Catalan News Agency
- The Spanish Government has 76% of Spain's total public debt, while the Autonomous Community share is “only” 17%
- Full fiscal autonomy for Catalonia in exchange for a “permanent and stable ally”, July 22nd
IT In-Transit
- The Spanish Fiscal Deficit Crisis, issue # 4
Financial Times
- The ties that bind Catalonia, Pankaj Ghemawat, June 16th
The Economist
- Split personality. How vulnerable is Spain? The answer depends on which Spain you mean, July 7th
- Regions to be worried. Local autonomy makes it harder to cut the budget deficit, April 2011

Autonomous-Community Elections, May 2011

Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Poportionality, Lisbon Treaty.

The Association of Regional Legislative Assemblies of the EU asks to participate in the drafting of European directives, Catalan News Agency

Catalan Parliament News

Autonomous-Community Elections, May 2011

:: Compilations

Autonomous-Community Legislation

Agreements of the Bilateral Commissions

Spanish Constitutional Court

Appeals of Unconstitucionality
Appeals against Autonomous-Community Laws Lodged by Central Government Institutions (April-July 2011)
Appeals against Spanish Laws Lodged by the Autonomous Communities (April-July 2011)

Conflicts on Distribution of Powers
Conflicts on Distribution of Powers Lodged by Autonomous Communities

Recent Polls
Centre d'Estudis de Opinió (CEO). Generalitat of Catalonia
Baròmetre d'Opinió Pública (BOP). 2ª onada 2011

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Estudio 2907. Debate sobre el Estado de la Nación
Estudio 2905. Barómetro junio 2011
Estudio 2888. Barómetro mayo 2011
Estudio 2885. Barómetro abril 2011
Estudio 2882. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. La Rioja
Estudio 2881. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Navarra
Estudio 2880. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Región de Murcia
Estudio 2879. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Extremadura
Estudio 2878. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Castilla y León
Estudio 2877. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Castilla-La Mancha
Estudio 2876. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Cantabria
Estudio 2875. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Canarias
Estudio 2874. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2011. Illes Balears
Estudio 2872. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas y Municipales 2011. Comunidad Valenciana
Estudio 2871. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas y Municipales 2011. Comunidad de Madrid
Estudio 2870. Preelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas y Municipales 2011. Aragón
Estudio 2857. Postelectoral de Cataluña. Elecciones autonómicas 2010

Gabinete de Prospección Sociológica. Gobierno Vasco
Sociómetro Vasco 46. Políticas Públicas. July 2011
Sondeo postelectoral de Elecciones a Juntas Generales y Municipales 2011. Jun 2011
Análisis Postelectoral de Elecciones a Juntas Generales y Municipales 2011. May 2011.